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Analogical reasoning is a landmark of
human cognition. Based on the realiza-
tion that the elements of two situations are
organized by similar systems of relations,
analogical inferences allow the transfer of
knowledge structures from a better-known
situation (the base analog) to a target situ-
ation that is relatively less understood (the
target analog).
Experimental research has demon-
strated that the retrieval of base analogs
from long term memory in response
to the proceesing of a target analog is
infrequent in the lack of semantic simi-
larities between both situations (Gick and
Holyoak, 1980; Keane, 1987; Gentner et al.,
1993; Trench and Minervino, 2014). With
the turn of the century, several natural-
istic observations of experts working in
their domains of expertise yielded a more
complex picture. While molecular biolo-
gists (Dunbar, 1997) and psychologists
(Saner and Schunn, 1999) still exhib-
ited mostly within-domain analogizing,
the observation of journalists and politi-
cians (Blanchette and Dunbar, 2001),
teachers (Richland et al., 2004), man-
agers (Bearman et al., 2007) and design
engineers (Christensen and Schunn,
2007) showed a more frequent use of
long-distance analogies. The naturalis-
tic study by Kretz and Krawczyk (2014)
on the use of analogies by economists also
demonstrates an abundance of distant
analogies in the sevice of an impres-
sive variety of communicative purposes,
most of which were not evident in prior
research. These goals included the gen-
eration of concrete source examples of
more general target concepts, the forma-
tion of visual images of source concepts,
the addition of colorful speech, the inclu-
sion of a target into a source concept, or
the differentiation between source and tar-
get concepts. With these results in mind,
the time is ripe to assert that the nat-
uralistic observation of experts shows a
more flexible use of analogical sources
than is predicted by experimental stud-
ies on analogical transfer, and simulated
by dominant computer models of ana-
logical retrieval (e.g., MAC/FAC, Forbus
et al., 1995; LISA, Hummel and Holyoak,
1997). How, then, to explain this analog-
ical abundance? In trying to account for
the contrasting results of the experimental
and the naturalistic traditions, the default
explanations revolve around the expertise
of the analogizers and the psychological
constraints of the target tasks. I will argue
that although both factors are likely to
bear some responsibility for this empirical
inconsistency, there are reasons to expect a
heavier weight of the latter.
THE EXPERTISE OF THE ANALOGIZERS
Shortly after having documented that
journalists and politicians generated
mostly distant analogies when argu-
ing for (or against) the referendum on
the independence of Quebec, Blanchette
and Dunbar (2000) obtained an in vitro
replication of this result with novice par-
ticipants generating their own analogies
for another realistic political topic: the
zero-deficit strategy for controlling pub-
lic debt. The authors concluded that their
prior results were due to the fact that
the analogizers were generating their
own analogies for a realistic situation,
rather than to their expertise in the target
issue. Trench et al. (2009a) provided sup-
port for this interpretation by replicating
Blanchette and Dunbar’s results with 10
different target topics. In the same vein,
Bearman et al. (2007) failed to observe
differences in the analogies proposed by
novices and experts solving management
problems. Rather than based on broad
expertise differences across-participants,
it seems that the ease of generating dis-
tant analogies depends on the goals of
the analogizer and on the extent to which
she understands the target analog at stake.
When the analogizer comprehends the
target analog better than her intended
audience, as in communicative situations
such as explaining a procedure to students
(Richland et al., 2004) or selling politi-
cal ideas to the population (Blanchette
and Dunbar, 2000, 2001; Trench et al.,
2009a), both experts and novices easily
generate distant analogies. But when the
target analog is insufficiently understood,
as when Dunbar’s (1997) expert molecular
biologists or Gick and Holyoak’s (1980)
novice participants are attempting to solve
a problem, distant analogies are seldom
generated.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS OF
THE TARGET TASK
Another explanation for the frequent
use of distant analogies in naturalis-
tic studies might arise from comparing
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the psychological constraints of natural-
istic analogy generation against those of
classical experimental studies. The stan-
dard experimental procedure comprises
an encoding phase, during which partici-
pants learn the base analogs, and a transfer
phase, where experimenters present par-
ticipants with either a semantically close
or a semanically distant target situation,
and assess whether its processing elic-
its the spontaneous retrieval of the base
analog. Based on this procedure, differ-
ences accross conditions were typically
taken to demonstrate the centrality of sur-
face similarities during analogical trans-
fer. In contrast with this highly controlled
environment—in which transfer can only
originate in the retrieval of the criti-
cal base analog from memory—in nat-
uralistic settings participants are free to
generate analogies by means of retriev-
ing their own base analogs (Blanchette
and Dunbar, 2000; Hofstadter and Sander,
2013), identifying conceptual metaphors
(Minervino et al., 2009), stumbling across
suitable analogs in the external environ-
ment (Christensen and Schunn, 2005)
or fabricating novel base analogs either
by generating extreme cases out of the
target analog (Clement, 1988), or by
reinstantiating the relational structure of
the target with a new set of elements
(Olguín et al., 2013). Upon generating
candidate analogies via any combination
of such mechanisms, the proportion of
close vs. distant analogies that people
produce in naturalistic settings can also
reflect a conscious editing of one type
of analogies in favor of the other type,
depending on the purpose of the reasoner
(Trench et al., 2009b).
The fact that the core components
of our retrieval mechanisms are invari-
ably set to favor semantically close base
analogs (Gentner et al., 1993; Trench and
Minervino, 2014) suggests that the above-
mentioned generative mechanisms could
possibly account for the frequency and
the diversity of the analogies generated
by experts. Future studies, both natural-
istic and experimental, are required to
understand how these overlooked anal-
ogy generation methods interact with
the variety of goals that realistic anal-
ogy generation can pursue, as eloquently
revealed by Kretz and Krawczyk’s (2014)
detailed analysis of the analogies produced
by expert economists.
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